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The performance of the Irish economy throughout the nineties, particularly the 
remarkable catching up of EU level, has been largely acclaimed in terms of the 
feat of the "Celtic tiger". At the same time, the Portuguese economy is also 
credited of some achievements, it qualified to EMU from its inception,1 and it is 
behaving more similarly to the other European economies (in relation to most 
of the 70's and 80's years). For instance, its intra-industry trade has approached 
European levels2 and it is now significantly exporting capitals. However, if we 
look not only globally at the decade, but also at the trend of its late years, and 
we make the appropriate comparisons, it becomes clear that, in contrast with 
Ireland, Portugal has one of the least performing economies amongst the 
"cohesion countries". In fact, during 1995-1999, it had, in relative terms, the 
most significant reduction of the pace of real convergence, even if it still 
remained slightly positive. It is no surprise that in a note issued in October 
1999, by the IMF, it was pointed out that "the key economic challenge was to 
secure continued, and preferably even more rapid, real economic convergence 
with other EU economies". In addition, one year later, the central bank even 
forecast that the Portuguese economy would not converge with EU in 2000-1. 
 
In this paper, we sustain that the unfavorable turn in the Portuguese economy’s 
EU convergence in the late nineties, is not a mere reflection of the economic 
cycle but it is tied with deeper causes, particularly related to insufficient 
openness, and to confusing and inert views on specialization and 
competitiveness matters.  
 
But, if Portugal has this kind of problems, let us first explain why the 
comparison with Ireland is economically relevant. As F. Barry put the question 
pretty clear: "a useful perspective can be gained by comparing the growth 
experiences of EU-periphery economies with each other rather than with their 
larger and wealthier neighbors. A number of structural similarities were 
pointed out which suggest that there is coherence to this argument" (1999a: 
62). Moreover, despite the recent evolution, it is worth to remember that both 
countries, which also belong to the same Atlantic periphery of EU (and that are 
relatively isolated in face of their respective powerful neighbor, having had 
                                                 
1 For details concerning its passage to EMU, see European Commission, 1997. 
2  See Silva and Lima, 1997, and Faustino et al., 2000. 
 4 
with them significant historical contentious), were in the outset of the nineties, 
in a very similar position, if not more favorable to Portugal.3 Why then, such an 
uneven, and in a way - if we consider the entry of the escudo into the EMS in 
1992 as the passage to a higher economic maturity and credibility -, almost 
unexpected development? 
 
Taking into account the previous observations, and for the sake of simplicity, in 
this paper, we will mainly focus on the comparison between Portuguese and 
Irish economies. We shall try to explain their divergent performances in the 
nineties, presenting some empirical data, and inquiring about the main causes 
that are behind it, emphasizing in particular the role of the external sector and 
related policies and strategies. 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE CATCHING UP PROCESS 
 
First of all, let us look at the basic facts. Portugal was in the postwar period, 
particularly since 1960, one of the most fast growing European economies, if 
not the fastest (Mateus, 1998), only depending on the starting point of the 
analysis. However, after a substantial increase in the decade following EC 
membership, the pace of convergence declined in the late nineties (tables 1 and 
2). In turn, Ireland had first a long period of weak growth, including the fifteen 
years just after EC membership in 1973. In fact, as shown by Ó Gráda and 
O'Rourke (1995: 212), average annual growth rates of GDP per capita, were 
smaller than those of Europe from 1950 up to 1973, and therefore, Ireland was 
diverging; they became slightly higher in 1973-1988 (2.1% to 1.9%), and only 
afterwards, they strongly accelerated. In the space of a short decade, beginning 
in the late 1980s, the Irish level (measured by GDP per head, in PPS terms), 
jumped from two thirds to the EU average and even more (figure 1 and table 1), 
achieving what has been widely recognized as a brilliant and rare success. 
 
                                                 
3  Based on the Cecchini’s Report calculations, F. Barry reminds us that it was predicted that Portugal should 
"benefit more than the other periphery countries from the Single Market" (1999a: 56). 
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Figure 1 
GDP per head, as a % of EU-15 average 
(Purchasing Power Standard Terms) 
 
Table 1 
GDP per head, as a percentage of EU-15 average 
(Purchasing Power Standard Terms) 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Greece 59.2 57.4 58.3 59.1 57.4 60.1 61.9 64.2 65.2 66.4 67.5 69.2 68.6 69.3 
Ireland 60.8 62.5 63.8 66.3 71.1 74.7 78.4 82.5 90.7 96.8 96.5 96.4 102.1 105.1 

















Number of years to reach 
average EU level according to 
the trend of late 1990s 
(base 1997) 
Greece -0.7 2.9 1.1 34 
Ireland 4.0 6.4 2.1 - 
Portugal 1.53 3.8 0.6 56 
 







































































As far as the catching up process is concerned, one of the most important 
consequences of the Irish experience in the nineties was the open challenge to 
the argument that real convergence “usually takes a long time” (Barro, 1996: 
14). In fact, according to the so-called “iron law of convergence” based on US 
evidence, the global gap between the States was reduced at the pace of 2% per 
annum from 1880 up to 1990.4 However, not only Ireland in the 1990s, but also 
South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, and Japan and Italy in the two 
preceding decades, show a rather different pattern. Indeed, from a secular trend 
point of view, all these countries in a relatively short period of time (one or two 
decades), reached or approached significantly the average level of the leading 
economies.5  Here is one of the reasons why the Irish and the other similar 
experiences are so important for countries seriously aiming at the catching up 
process. 
 
Let us now look more closely at the evolution both economies in a comparative 
basis. Using GDP per capita as indicator, the pace of quick convergence of the 
Portuguese economy was clearly broken in the 1990s, more strikingly in their 
second half. During the two periods 1986-90 and 1990-95, Portugal had the 
second highest growth rate of cohesion countries, which has even more than 
doubled between them, approaching the Irish momentum.6 In contrast, later, in 
1995-99, we observe a general curbing of this rate (table 2). However, among 
the three countries considered, this is much more felt in Portugal than in Ireland 
or Greece (6 times to around only 3). It is true that the average Portuguese GDP 
growth rate was 3.3% in 1996-1999 (European Commission, 2000: 131). At 
first glance, it seems a reasonably fair rate. However, because of the reduction 
of its gap towards EU rate, it only provided a very small increment to the 
convergence process. 
 
The Portuguese growth performance appears to be still less satisfactory if we 
take into account some exceptional factors operating in the late nineties, like 
                                                 
4 For details, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, and Barro, 1994. 
5 Also Portugal, from 1870 up to 1990, had its most significant advances in the road to European convergence in 
relatively short periods of time, in particular 1960-1973 and 1986-1990; see Aguiar and Figueiredo, 1999. 
6 Due to frequent revisions, caused mainly by enlargements (in the nineties, to Eastern Germany in 1991, and to 
Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995), and methodological changes, EU statistical data for comparative 
purposes, namely as far as GDP per capita is concerned, are not linear and offer some practical difficulties. In the 
table 1, we use the figures for EU-15 of the Eurostat for the European Commission in 1999. In all events, if the 
variables analyzed in the text may have some quantitative changes in future revisions, the main trends are 
nevertheless, in their essence, well established. The analysis of small quantitative changes is not the objective of 
this paper. 
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EXPO 98 and correlated public works7, with its multiplier effects - no 
comparable public spending stimulus is found in Ireland during the decade -, 
whilst in the preceding years growth was affected by the recessions of US and 
other countries in 1991, and of most continental EU economies in 19938. In due 
and rigorous terms we should discount or at least to blur over time these short 
term strong effects that, in a certain sense, favorably biased the results of the 
late 1990s. So, it is hard to deny that we are in face of a poor performance of 
the Portuguese GDP in this period (either in per capita in PPS terms or even in 
the single growth rate case). 
 
The parallel with Greece is also highly interesting. In terms of GDP per capita 
(in PPP), Portugal had overtaken this “cohesion” country in the late 1980s but 
the gap remained narrow. During the nineties, Greece clearly improved its 
relative performance, and according to the calculations based on the trend of 




3. ON LARGE AND FLEXIBLE OUTWARD ORIENTATION 
 
Examining Irish experience since the 1960's, Barry (1999b: 40) points out the 
specific features of the last decade developments in the following terms: 
 
"Industrial policy from the 1960s to the mid-1980s concentrated 
almost exclusively on encouraging high productivity foreign 
manufacturing companies to use Ireland as an export base. This 
raised productivity substantially, but Ireland failed to converge 
on Europeans living standards because its rate of job creation 
lagged behind. In terms of the balance constraint, while foreign-
owned industry rose exports, indigenous industry lost market 
share to competing imports. What then is different in the 1990s? 
Foreign export-oriented industry has expanded considerably and 
                                                 
7 Like the new bridge Vasco da Gama over the Tagus river, in Lisbon; similarly, the coming into work of Auto-
Europa in 1995, that had a profound impact in production and exports was also one of these exceptional factors 
having strong short term effects in the growth of this period, that nevertheless was comparatively poor. 
8 In fact, according to the figures presented by A. Mateus (1998: 218), the years of high growth in Portugal had 
mainly been those of 1987-1990, where GDP increased 7.2% on arithmetical annual average, what for sure, 
contributed powerfully to the catching up of the whole period. 
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a much more competitive indigenous manufacturing sector has 
stopped the loss in home market share while raising its export 
orientation. The internationally-tradable market services are 
booming. All of these developments raise demand for the non-
traded sectors, which have been stimulated on the supply side by 


















1990 1997** % change 1997 
Austria 26.0 28.4 9.2 42.3 
Belgium-Lux. 61.5 70.8 15.1 72.9*** 
Denmark 27.1 28.6 5.5 36.0 
Finland 19.4 34,3 76.8 39.8 
Greece 12.2 9.3 -23.8 16.1 
Ireland 56.0 69.1 23.4 79.7 
Korea - 33.1 - 38.1 
Netherlands 47.2 53.4 13.1 56.0 
Portugal 27.4 23.6 -13.9 31.4 
Spain 11.3 19.6 73.5 28.4 
Sweden 25.2 36.4 44.4 43.8 
Taiwan - 37.9 - - 
Euro zone - - - 32.1 
 
* current prices and exchange rates, % 
** Korea and Taiwan, 1998   *** Only Belgium 
Source: OECD International Comparisons; OECD Economic Outlook; SEDES 
 
It should be stressed first that, in the last decades, Ireland had a clear outward 
orientation, which has been reinforced along time, and became without doubt 
an open economy. In contrast, Portugal, as had already been noted by Balassa 
(1976: 241), particularly as far as foreign capital was concerned, remained 
closed. Another author, analyzing the postwar up to 1990, observed that in the 
middle of the eighties, i.e., at the time of EC membership, in comparison with 
other small countries of Europe, Portugal was “one of the least open to external 
trade” (Lains, 1994: 948). Moreover, although imports of goods are 
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traditionally much higher than exports,9 calculations suggest that in the 
threshold of the nineties, Portugal had one of the highest degrees of self-
sufficiency in manufacturing goods among small and medium sized OECD 
economies.10  
 
Across the nineties, it became clear that the degree of openness of the 
Portuguese economy, measured by the relation of exports of goods to GDP,11 
remained not only relatively low, but also, unlike most other small and medium 
sized European economies, it has even decreased between 1990 and 1997 (table 
3). Total exports of goods and services (where Portugal has an important 
comparative advantage in tourism) show a similar pattern: their relation to GDP 
is comparatively low (including lower to that of Euro zone), and also has 
decreased between 1990 and 1996.12 
 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that Ireland is not alone; some other small 
European countries that performed well in the same period, Finland for 
example, also became significantly more open. Furthermore, despite its greater 
economic size, that presupposes a lesser degree of openness, Spain is also doing 
far better in this regard, and is now very close to the Portuguese level, and the 
gap is still narrower in the exports of goods and services (table 3).13 
 
                                                 
9 Anyone who is familiar to Portuguese economic problems knows well that the external equilibrium has 
historically been reached mainly through transfers, first of all emigrants’ remittances, more recently, transfers 
from EU also played a significant role in this equilibrium. 
10 This degree was for Portugal 72.5%, Ireland 68.6%, Greece 71.3%, Austria 31.6%, Belgium-Luxembourg 
29.5%, Denmark 44.3%, Netherlands 51.7%, Sweden 70.6%, Vilares, 1997: 141. 
11 There are several reasons that suggested that this is by far the most appropriate measure of openness (in 
comparison, for example, with the average of the sum exports plus imports), for the set of countries examined in 
the table 3. We present here one of them (others are mentioned in the text). Taking into consideration that the 
Portuguese and Irish economies have no significant formal protective barriers towards foreign exporters (at least 
in the European context, where are their main trading partners), to measure the degree of openness by the 
relation of exports (of goods, or goods and services), to GDP, fits well the objective of showing their ability to 
penetrate and responsiveness to world market. 
12 This relation was 34.3% in 1990, and 33.7% in 1996; the decrease is larger if we compare the periods 1986-
1990 (32.6%), and 1991-1995 (30.1%); European Commission, 1997: 15. 
13 According to OECD figures, the degree of openness (exports of goods to GDP) of the Portuguese economy 
was in 1997, below that of Germany (24.5%) and slightly higher than those of United Kingdom (22.1%), France 




(Percentage of GDP) 
 
Country 1990 1995 1999 
Greece 47.8 46.6 43.5 
Ireland 37.8 36.4 31.5 
Portugal 40.6 44.5 44.7 
 
* Current expenditures plus capital expenditures 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 2000 
 
We may thus conclude that Portugal has not yet embraced an outward 
orientation, particularly in the field of export promotion, so characteristic of 
many of the just mentioned industrialized small countries or the NIEs (Newly 
Industrialized Economies), and that Portuguese economy remains relatively 
closed.14 This is not a simple feature without policy consequences, on the 
contrary. On this matter, as was stressed by some authors: 
 
“Small open economies to a large extent differ from the policy 
questions encountered by the bigger (and often less open) 
economies … whereas small open economies cannot influence 
the stance of the world economy, they are often substantially 
exposed to the process of globalization. Indeed, they have no 
other option but to constantly adjust their economic system … At 
a more pragmatic level, small open economies lack the financial 
means and economic leverage to implement policies aimed at 
specific industries and, consequently, have to focus in generic 
measures. They opt, for example, for trade liberalization rather 
than for so-called strategic trade policies” (van Bergeijk et al., 
1999: 5). 
 
                                                 
14 In this sense, we should note that the standard presentation of Portugal "as a small open economy", so popular 
and easily adopted, without any criticism, in textbooks and courses alike, is nevertheless superficial and 
misleading. Neves (1995) is representative of this contradiction, writing that: "The role of internal demand was 
always dominant, even if Portugal is considered a small open economy"; p. 334 or “Portugal is a small open 
economy. This made economic openness a constant and very important element throughout the Portuguese 
economy. Portuguese history, strongly tied to the discoveries of the fifteen and sixteen centuries, and the colonial 
empire which derived from them, only underlined this aspect”; p. 347. Of course, further research and a closer 
scrutiny on this fundamental point is required, but also a more careful use of the terms. As pointed out in the text, 
they can have important policy implications. 
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Table 5 
Portugal and Ireland: Trade with EU and main neighboring partner 
 






      
Exports (% total) 65.7 75.0 80.5 80.7 82.0 82.8 
Imports (% total) 48.7 61.8 71.9 74.3 78.1 77.4 
       
Spain 
 
      
Exports:       
% total 3.6 6.7 13.3 14.6 15.9 17.7 
% total intra-EU 5.5 8.9 16.5 18.1 19.4 21.4 
       
Imports       
% total 5.5 11.0 14.4 20.0 24.4 24.8 
% total intra-EU 11.3 17.7 20.0 26.9 31.2 32.1 
       
IRELAND       
       
European Union       
       
Exports (% total) 79.1 75.7 78.6 73.5 69.3 65.9 
Imports (% total) 78.5 76.1 73.9 66.0 61.6 62.4 
       
United Kingdom       
       
Exports       
% total 43.1 34.4 34.0 28.1 22.4 21.7 
% total intra-EU 54.5 45.2 43.3 38.3 32.4 33.0 
       
Imports       
% total 55.5 46.3 47.2 41.4 38.2 37.5 
% total intra-UE 70.8 60.8 63.9 62.8 62.0 60.0 
       
 
Source: INE, Estatísticas do Comércio Externo and Eurostat 
 
We also must note that, as a consequence of the lack of an export drive, 
Portugal has not benefited from the increasingly higher elasticity of world trade 
that characterized the nineties in relation to previous postwar decades.15 
Illustrative of this weakness, is the fact that, whilst Ireland moved to a large 
surplus in the current account, the Portuguese current deficit reached very high 
and increasing levels (8.8% of the GDP in 1999, more than doubling from 
1996). As referred above by F. Barry, external and domestic dimensions of 
                                                 
15 According to WTO figures, the elasticity of world merchandise exports to world production was 3.3 in 1990-
98, much higher than in the 1980s (1.68), the 1970s (1.25), or the 1960s (1.4); Silva, 1997: 64. 
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competitiveness are of course linked and therefore, this contrasting evolution 
must not, once more, be a surprise. 
 
In relation with the preceding empirical evidence, it is also appropriate to 
remind that, according to the classical analysis of Balassa, a lower degree of 
openness has a negative impact on productivity (in so far, due to greater 
competition, exposed sector tends to be more productive), and consequently in 
the overall performance of the Portuguese economy, and of course, in the pace 
of real convergence. In addition, it is interesting to note that, as external trade 
was decreasing its part, a “non-exposed” sector like public administration – also 
undoubtedly one of the less efficient across Western Europe -, was increasing 
its own part in Portuguese GDP, contrary to what happened in Ireland and 
Greece (table 4). 
 
From a free trade point of view, it must be underlined that, as shown in the 
Bhagwati’s classical work Protectionism (1988: 73), the emergence of strong 
and competitive exporting industries is one of the most effective barriers to all 
kinds of protectionism. This is highly true for small open economies inasmuch 
they absolutely need imports of inputs, out of any restriction. In these 
circumstances, imports as well as exports are quite good. Obviously, Portugal 
still seems far from the fundamentals of this modern economic logic that fosters 
the world economy. 
 
Considering the global relevance of the external economic relations, other 
contrasts between the two countries must also be raised. Let us look now at the 
geographic concentration issue. As tables 5 and 6 show well, the Portuguese 
trade in the nineties became much more concentrated in Europe, particularly in 
Spain.16 In fact, Portugal has the highest concentration ratio in EU of all 
member States (Silva, 2000), and the smallest participation in extra-EU exports 
(table 6). The situation can also be illustrated through the fact that, in 1998, 
extra-EU trade GDP ratio was only 6% for Portugal, and 9,7% for EU-15 
(European Commission, 2000: 134). 
                                                 
16 As can be confirmed in the table 5, this is strikingly in contrast with the case of trade between Ireland and 
United Kingdom. Taking into account the low level of the starting point in 1986, we cannot say that trade 
relations between Portugal and Spain are "excessive" (only further analysis could provide such an answer). 
Anyway a risk is increasing for Portugal and diminishing for Ireland, the question can be put as follows: 
"Geographical factors tend to cause 'webs of dependency', where small economies become locked into the 
growth performance of their encompassing region, which is often dominated by a single large economy" 





Extra-EU Trade by Countries, 
Breakdown and Evolution 1990, 1995, 1996 and 1985-1996 
(ranked according to exports of goods in 1996) 
 



















Germany 23.2 25.7 24.7 5.0 28.8 29.2 28.3 5.3 
France 13.9 12.8 12.7 2.9 15.5 14.9 14.5 4.5 
Italy 12.3 11.3 11.0 0.8 12.7 13.3 14.2 5.4 
United Kingdom 17.3 17.0 17.9 3.9 15.6 13.3 13.8 3.3 
UEBL 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.0 
Netherlands 8.8 9.6 11.0 4.2 5.2 5.4 5.0 3.6 
Sweden 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.0 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.6 
Spain 5.7 5.0 5.0 2.6 3.8 4.2 4.3 6.3 
Austria 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.6 5.3 
Finland 1.9 1.4 1.5 0.2 2.0 2.3 2.4 4.8 
Denmark 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 3.2 
Ireland 1.0 1.6 1.6 9.6 1.0 1.6 1.8 10.4 
Greece 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 4.7 
Portugal 1.1 1.2 1.1 2.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 3,5 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.8 
(Total*) (439.4) (544.8) 580.0) - (390.6) (572.2) (623.4) - 
 
* thousand millions ECU 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Moreover, despite all efforts and advice for a more balance external trade that 
have been done (Silva, 1990), Portuguese economic links with world regions 
others than Europe remain quite negligible in the globalization era. This is 
notably true, as far as US, the growth pole of the last decade at a world scale, 
are concerned.17 In 1994-1999, US market only absorbed 4.8% of Portuguese 
exports, much less than the EU average, 7.5%.18 Moreover, as can be seen in the 
table 7, between 1990 and 1999, Irish exports to US had been multiplied by 6.5, 
those of EU-15 more than doubled, whilst the Portuguese exports had only been 
increased by 83%, well below the former rates. This evolution not only shows 
the limited geographical scope of Portuguese trade orientation but also its great 
lack of flexibility in a constantly changing world economy. Furthermore, unable 
of taking advantage of the “strong dollar”, and unlike EU-15, the rate of 
increase of Portuguese exports to US market has even decreased from 1994-
1996 to 1997-1999 (the correspondent European rate more than doubled).19 
 
Table 7 
                                                 
17 For historical details on Portuguese/US trade relations, see Silva, 1990. 
18 These data are from the Annual Report of the Bank of Portugal 1999, p. 123. 
19 See the source quoted in the previous note. 
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Exports to the United States 
(Millions of Ecu/euro) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ireland 1 531 1 697 1 794 2 200 2 327 2 791 3 492 5 203 7 545 10 089 
Portugal 622 503 494 578 785 807 853 987 1 065 1 139 




In another major aspect of its outward orientation, Ireland favored strongly the 
inflow of FDI since the 1960s, and it has been highly successful in this regard 
during the nineties, in particular in the last years of the decade. This is shown in 
the tables 8 and 9. Portugal had peaks of FDI inflows in 1989-91 (what 
corresponds, as referred to above, more or less to its period of high growth), 
later the annual flows became unstable and the pace of increase was clearly 
reduced (despite a new peak in 1997-98). As far as the stock of FDI inflows is 
concerned, Portugal also gained some ground in relation to Ireland in the early 
1990s but lost it following years, and was, by the end of the decade, in the 
weakest position amongst all “cohesion countries” (as well as in 1985).20 
 
Table 8 
FDI net inflows 









1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ireland 192 1 182 8 066 1 062 1 442 1 121 838 1 447 2 618 2 743 8 579 18 322 
Portugal 1 041 1 562 1 755 2 448 1 873 1 534 1 270 685 1 368 2 278 2 802 570 
 
* Annual average 
Source: World Investment Report, several issues 
 
Why such a success of Ireland in attracting foreign capitals? According to a 
report of the European Commission, published in 1999, the answer mainly lies 
in the following reasons: 
 
                                                 
20 In fact, in the postwar, Portugal had already a much lower degree of FDI, in comparison with all these 
countries (Silva, 1990), which is one more reason to pursue a strong policy to attract FDI. 
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"Ireland now has the largest share in manufacturing of research 
intensive industries, although these are mainly subsidiaries of 
MNEs with headquarters outside of the country. Ireland's share 
of labor intensive industries is the lowest in Europe. Ireland is 
positively specialized in high growth, highly globalized 
industries, in the high productivity sector, and has reinforced all 
of these strengths during the last decade. The structural funds, a 
tax policy favorable for businesses, the upgrading of its 
educational system and the return of skilled workers have 
together created a successful policy mix which attracts and 
upgrades firms in dynamic industries". 
 
Table 9 
Stock FDI inflows 
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Greece 8 309 14 016 19 306 22 948 
Ireland 4 649 5 502 11 706 43 969 
Portugal 3 463 9 436 17 246 20 513 
Spain 8 939 65 916 112 136 112 582 
 
Source: World Investment Report, several issues 
 
This means that Ireland had a comprehensive approach about how to attract 
FDI, and fully played the internationalization game. 
 
As far as FDI outflows are concerned, the two countries also diverge (table 10). 
Portugal arrived later to the process, but during the early nineties it had 
accelerated these flows more quickly than Ireland. However, the relation 
between the two countries had completely changed by the end of the decade, 
with Ireland, once more, ahead of Portugal. On the other hand, we must take 
into account that the Portuguese figures in this regard, are influenced by the 
strong move to invest in Brazil in 1997-99, one of the main features of 
Portuguese internationalization (Silva, 2000). 
 
Table 10 
FDI net outflows 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ireland 340 378 2 765 195 215 220 438 820 727 1 008 3 906 5 418 
Portugal 57 454 2 006 463 687 147 287 688 776 1 667 2 901 2 679 
 
* Annual average 
Source: World Investment Report, several issues 
 
It is thus clear that the two economies are in a very different position in relevant 
areas of the external sector like trade and investment, and all these facts must be 
considered in the evaluation of their performance in the decade. 
 
 
4. ON SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETITIVENESS ISSUES 
 
Why these relative difficulties in production of the Portuguese economy, 
particularly in its links with the world economy? The answer leads us to a 
deeper inquire about how far have gone the specialization and competitiveness 
processes. Let us see this point more closely. 
 
Firstly, as far as Portuguese agricultural sector is concerned, Castro (1991) 
refers that in the first years of EC membership, instead of starting the necessary 
specialization of agriculture, where comparative advantages were not so 
obvious in many sectors, the diversification was maintained, if not increased, 
and the situation has not yet changed substantially. In an overall view, 
Portuguese agriculture lagged far behind all the others of member States, and 
inner rural areas became the poorest of the Community. Meanwhile, Ireland had 
been specialized in the sector, promoted the increase of production and 
productivity, and contrary to Portugal became a beneficiary of CAP (Mateus, 
1998: 153). Certainly, Ireland has its own agriculture problems, but similar to 
those of most other EU member States (Matthews, 1995). 
 
However, Portuguese specialization lies more on manufacturing industries and 
in the services (Silva, 2000). So, concerning the specialization of the 
manufacturing,21 the authors of the Report to the European Commission (1999) 
                                                 
21 Here, we analyze only the manufacturing industries. In relation to services, it is possible that they will have in 
the Portuguese convergence process, a greater role (than most of the countries considered in the table 3). 
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on this matter, found a basically stable European context in the nineties ("a 
weak overall tendency to an increasing production specialization", and "a weak 
overall tendency for export specialization to decrease"). However, they 
underlined the peculiarities of our two countries: 
 
"Ireland maintained its position as the most specialized country 
- during the decade, it continued to intensify its specialization ... 
Portugal is the exception, insofar as specialization is decreasing 
strongly and robustly in both production and trade. This 
declining specialization reflects the shrinking share of the textile 
industry, which once accounted for 13.4% of production, but 
dropped to 9.4% in 1998. Food production and wood related 
industries also lost ground" (European Commission, 1999:18). 
 
Therefore, in the main industries and sectors, Ireland has deeply been 
specialized, whilst Portugal has not yet known a comparable process, and is 
still in a changing landscape in this crucial regard. More precisely, Portugal has 
not yet coped at a mature stage, with specialization and competitiveness issues 
and decisions. It is true that the textile, clothing and footwear industries had 
likely an excessive high proportion of Portuguese production and exports in the 
early nineties, because of European protection against outside world, 
particularly developing countries (Silva, 2000). Of course, in our view, this 
protectionist situation should change without delay, but a radical shift with 
neglect of these industries, without their competitive transformation, would be 
a very costly and uncertain process that puts in question a well-established 
comparative advantage of the country. In 1998, a certain number of advanced 
economies remain quite competitive in these areas: Germany was the first 
world exporter in textile, and Italy is the second in clothing (after China/Hong 
Kong). Moreover, the United States, despite their leading role in the 
information technology sector that propelled the world economy in the 
meantime, also increased the participation in the world exports of textile and 
clothing between 1990 and 1998.22 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, in 1998, they only represented a quarter of total Portuguese exports, and the problems put by their 
upgrading (in tourism for example, Silva, 2000), are rather similar to those  
of manufacturing industries. 
22 Textile from 4.8% of the world exports in 1990 to 6.1% in 1998; clothing 2.4% to 4.9%. In this point, we use 
the statistics of the WTO, Annual Report 1999. 
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Concerning the Portuguese situation, the fate of the Porter Report is very 
meaningful in this regard.23 When publicly presented in the initial years of the 
nineties, it was of course something imperfect, but it was also a step forward in 
the good direction, i.e., the search for a more comprehensive Portuguese 
orientation and to enable crucial decisions in the field of specialization and 
international competitiveness. Moreover, instead of waiting for a "revolution in 
competitiveness", coming from above, the Report advocated a more subtle way 
based mainly on the upgrading of the so-called “traditional” sectors where 
Portugal had some degree of comparative advantage (including the 
improvement of use and production of correlated equipment and machinery, in 
the logic of the clusters). In short, refusing high and risky stakes through the 
launching of completely new capital intensive industries, Porter’s proposition 
only followed the historical pattern of many other European countries.24 In this 
regard, the example of Italy’s upgrading in the postwar is of course relevant to 
Portugal.25 In fact, a lot of similarities in production and trade exist between 
these two countries, in particular as far as clothing, textile, shoe, ceramics, and 
marble industries are concerned (Silva, 1990: 94). However, not only about 
Italy, but also in general terms, a serious debate was never started on this 
decisive subject, still less the implementation of any policies deriving from it, 
and the project the Report was supposed to promote, was given up and sadly 
forgotten afterwards26. 
 
So, it is far from well established what Portugal must produce and how, to 
which production and exports the country should guide its efforts or address its 
incentives. Without a profound debate followed by practical measures, the 
country fell in a persistent ambiguity, if not in a state of confusion and inertia, 
on central issues of specialization and international competitiveness. This has 
obvious effects in the global economic performance and for taking advantage 
of existing opportunities in the world economy. The Irish experience shows 
                                                 
23 For details on this document, see M. E. Porter, 1994. 
24 See in particular, his work The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990. 
25 In this sense, it is also worth to remember the case of textile industries in Italy, the same European Report we 
have been quoting, points out: "The shares of textile industries have been decreasing slightly, but less so than in 
other countries. This led to increasing market shares for Italy in this sector, and more generally to its share in 
labor intensive industries. It has also increased the dissimilarity in Italy's production structure compared to the 
EU average. However, Italy is focusing on the quality segment of textile industries, and the unit value of its 
exports is significantly higher than the European average"; European Commission, 1999: 16. 
26 Taking into account the suggestions made by the Report (Porter, 1994), in order to strengthen the wood 
industry (where the links with agriculture – so neglected - are important), its loss of ground in the following 
years, is without doubt also representative of this fact. 
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well the importance of a strategy, existing since the 1960s, in favor of capital 
intensive industries and foreign capitals; the definition of adequate policies by 
the end of the 1980s, strongly enhanced the overall ability of Irish economic 
strategy to cope with the problems of real convergence. The two main options 
(or the mix, eventually to be adopted) require a different treatment and 
preparation, and these problems have not yet been satisfactorily put and solved 
in Portugal. For instance, newly capital intensive industries, like in Ireland, will 
benefit less from the learning curve, and consequently demand a long period to 
bear fruits.27 Whatever the strategy and policies that may be followed, great 
resources for training and high quality standards in education that sometimes 
demand quite a generation to be created and developed, are always required. 
Without a clearer and more transparent orientation in these matters, established 
in due time, Portugal has not yet enough high qualified skills neither for the 
launching of new capital intensive industries nor for the improvement of 
quality in the so-called “traditional” industries. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
During most of the nineties, Portugal has thus slowed down the pace of 
convergence to EU level, particularly in the late years. This move puts a set of 
problems that we cannot dodge. Very likely, this is the result of policies and 
strategies adopted (or not!) throughout the decade. So far that are no clear and 
appropriate decisions taken on central issues for a sustainable upgrading of 
Portuguese economy. After trying to explain its difference in relation to Irish 
economic performance, we want to raise some more points in the final part of 
this paper. 
 
First, in particular since 1987, Portugal is benefiting from EU structural funds, 
including cohesion funds, whose raison d'être is just for accelerating not to 
                                                 
27 We must point out that the Irish strategy, based on capital intensive industries was criticised in the seventies, 
by Balassa (1976: 241). Notwithstanding the costs, from the 1960s untill the end of the 1980s, in the nineties, 
helped by the boom in the information technology sector (here, it is the element of good luck in the Irish case, 
hard to reproduce somewhere else), the results were highly impressive. Irish as well as Italian experiences show 
specificities of each country, we could add others, we may also conclude that any European country (including of 
course, Portugal), has to find its own way, amidst a general upgrading trade strategy. 
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reduce the pace of real convergence.28 From an economic as well as political 
point of view, these funds should be by their own nature, temporary and not to 
last indefinitely.29 This is why the Marshall Plan remained such an important 
mark in European economic history. On the other hand, this means that 
beneficiary countries should be aware of how to use them wisely and to look 
effectively for reaching the major objective of convergence, and not taking 
them for granted whatever happens (what, for instance, would be a practical 
obstacle to future enlargements, and in the case of misuse, would contribute to 
weaken the country’s position). If necessary, the successful experience of 
Ireland in the nineties, where structural funds played a relevant role too, gave 
still more weight to the argument of an open recognition of their temporary 
nature. 
 
Second, now, when the Irish experiment is widely celebrated, it is worth to 
remind with more details that it was not a strategy without costs. By the end of 
the eighties, the country has engaged a set of structural reforms like a balanced 
budget, a fiscal reform (reduction of the revenue tax, improvement of fiscal 
administration, etc.), social policies combining more equity with improved 
efficiency of social systems, and the implementation of development-oriented 
policies (Geary, 1992: 269). Because of the painful industrial restructuring, 
unemployment has increased, and only in the last years it decreased 
significantly (the standardized unemployment rate was, in annual base de 
14,5% em 1990, reaching a maximum of 15,6% in 1993, being 6,2% at the end 
of 1999). However, "this program has benefited from a large political 
consensus, it reached a high level of credibility (domestically, as well as in EU 
and in the rest of the world), and it took wisely advantage of the expectations of 
economic agents" (Silva and Lima, 1997: 5). So, the main political and social 
forces had the courage to implement the necessary reforms that paved the way 
for future economic convergence.30 
                                                 
28 Clearly, in the nineties, the Portuguese economy was more successful in the nominal convergence (European 
Commission, 1997), than in the real convergence. The Cohesion Fund in particular, aimed at a better 
combination of both. 
29 In principle, structural funds should of course be maintained, but applied according to the trade cycle, long-
term industrial restructuring and other similar reasons, which are obviously temporary and can affect any part of 
the European Union. 
30 This is particularly true as far as European integration is concerned. In contrast, in the middle of the nineties, 
there was some fluctuation of the Portuguese position in key aspects of European integration, namely towards 
EMU. Respecting the economic strategy to be followed, we then analyzed the problem in a paper where reluctant 
adhesion was opposed to full adhesion (Silva, 1995). Politically, it can be illustrated by the official acceptance of 
the idea of a referendum on EU Treaty (later abandoned). Till that period, the idea of a referendum had been 
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Third, it is clear by the end of the nineties, that Portugal will have increased 
overseas responsibilities in the near future, particularly in Brazil, Portuguese-
speaking African countries and East Timor. This bigger international role only 
can be efficiently played, if it is based on a higher level of development and 
sound economic foundations in order to release a greater amount of resources, 
namely financial, to the partnership with all these countries (as well as 
triangular partnerships), and giving them good examples in economic 
management, macro or micro. This increases and not diminishes the importance 
of the catching up process and of the adoption of policies that can lead to it 
(and requires more not less qualified ties with European Union and other 
developed regions of the world like the United States), particularly in the fields 
where the country needs them more as is obviously the case of the external 
sector. 
 
Of course, Irish experience cannot be transplanted to Portugal, but there is at 
least one lesson to be learned. Putting it into the context: in no way we question 
macroeconomic stability and the well-founded principles of the Maastricht 
Treaty and of the Stability and Growth Pact. However, under the circumstances 
prevailing in most time of the last decade, for a truly small open economy, the 
criteria for nominal convergence, after their achievement (or credible trend in 
this sense) should have been seen as given, and also, we should look at beyond 
them. In fact, overemphasizing exclusively the need of macroeconomic 
stability, we have neglected since the early 1990s, the implementation of a 
commercial strategy (including the stimulus to develop an export and 
competitive culture).31 Of course, it only would be successfully achieved as a 
part of a set of structural reforms. In the absence of such a strategy, Portuguese 
economy remained too closed and without active and sustained long term 
external policies. However, from a global point of view, this is the main 
practical lesson of postwar to countries seriously aiming at a catching up 
                                                                                                                                                        
rejected on the basis of the large national consensus on Portuguese European integration. At the same time, 
Ireland looked closely attached to EMU economic strategy (the referendum already belonged to the traditional 
Irish standing towards European integration main steps). This courageous and far-reaching Irish strategy (as well 
as that of Finland), accepting fully the essential of EMU, must be emphasized taking into consideration the rather 
different position of neighboring United Kingdom. Likely, outside observers and economic agents negatively 
perceived the Portuguese fluctuation. 
31 In particular, after the entry of escudo in EMS, in 1992, the policy incentives to extra-price competitiveness 
were highly required; see about Portuguese loss of competitiveness in the nineties, European Commission, 1997: 
65. 
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process of the leading economies, in particular, when they are small and are at 
relatively advanced stages of economic development. So, the strategy towards 
EMU should have been complemented with a general commercial strategy, in 
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